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Comments on Elinor Ostrom

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  • Gary D. Libecap

    (University of Arizona)

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  • Gary D. Libecap, 1990. "Comments on Elinor Ostrom," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(1), pages 112-116, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:112-116
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002001008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1985. "Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 368-385, June.
    2. Libecap, Gary D., 1986. "Property rights in economic history: Implications for research," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 227-252, July.
    3. Pashigian, B Peter, 1985. "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-interests Are Being Protected?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(4), pages 551-584, October.
    4. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Williamson, Oliver E, 1981. "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1537-1568, December.
    6. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    7. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
    8. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1985. "The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 690-714, August.
    9. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    10. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1987. "Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
    11. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1984. "Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 87-98, March.
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