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Environmental legislation and the impact of lobbying activities

Author

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  • Bartsch, Elga
  • Thomas, Ingo P.
  • Rauscher, Michael

Abstract

The paper is concerned with effects of lobbying activities by political pressure groups that wish to affect environmental legislation. Two interest groups are considered, environmentalists on the one hand and a polluters' lobby on the other. These two groups can influence the environmental policy in two ways. First, they support those political parties that promise to implement their favoured kind of environmental regulation. This support has an impact on election probabilities and, therefore, on the environmental policy measures implemented by the new government. The second way of influencing political decisions is to exert pressure on an existing government. These two approaches are used in the paper to address the questions of how environmental quality is affected by lobbying activities and how large the resource waste due to lobbying is.

Suggested Citation

  • Bartsch, Elga & Thomas, Ingo P. & Rauscher, Michael, 1993. "Environmental legislation and the impact of lobbying activities," Kiel Working Papers 562, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:562
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
    7. Hal R. Varian, 1989. "Measuring The Deadweight Costs Of Dup And Rent Seeking Activities," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 81-95, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rauscher, Michael, 1995. "Protectionists, environmentalists, and the formation of environmental policy in an open economy," Discussion Papers, Series II 256, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    2. Michaelis, Peter, 1994. "Regulate us, please!: On strategic lobbying in Cournot-nash oligopoly," Kiel Working Papers 626, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Bommer, Rolf & Schulze, Günther G., 1994. "Economic integration and environmental policy: Does NAFTA increase pollution?," Discussion Papers, Series II 218, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    4. Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2000. "Public Preferences, Statutory Regulations and Bargaining in Field Margin Provision for Ecological Main Structures," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, January.
    5. Y. Hossein Farzin & Jinhua Zhao, 2003. "Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against Environmental Regulation," Working Papers 2003.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Rauscher, Michael, 1995. "Protectionists, environmentalists, and the formation of environmental policy in an open economy," Kiel Working Papers 685, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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