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Public Policy and Constitutional Prescription

Author

Listed:
  • Gordon C. Rausser
  • Pinhas Zusman

Abstract

In public policy analysis, much confusion exists about the roles of explanation and prescription. To offer a new perspective, a paradigm is developed that gives both theoretical and empirical meaning to the constitutional determination of political preference functions or public sector governance structures. Current policies are viewed as a rational outcome of a political-economic process. Three relevant spaces are specified: result, policy instrument, and constitutional. For the policy instrument space, the paradigm provides a framework for generating testable propositions on government behavior, while, for the constitutional space, the framework is prescriptive. The collective-choice rules of the constitutional space structure the tradeoff between public and special interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon C. Rausser & Pinhas Zusman, 1992. "Public Policy and Constitutional Prescription," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(2), pages 247-257.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:74:y:1992:i:2:p:247-257.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1242479
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ernst-August Nuppenau, 2018. "Eco-System Services in Agrarian Value Chains: Value Detection of Bio-Diversity as Public Good Provision, Problems, and Institutional Issues," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, December.
    2. Gordon C. Rausser, 1992. "Predatory versus Productive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-157, Summer.
    3. Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2000. "Public Preferences, Statutory Regulations and Bargaining in Field Margin Provision for Ecological Main Structures," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, January.
    4. Beghin, John C. & Fafchamps, M., 1995. "Constitution, Institutions, and the Political Economy of Farm Policies. What Empirical Content?," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1620, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Lyons, Robert F. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1994. "Disruption and continuity in Bulgaria's agrarian reform," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt20n2p0ns, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    6. Rausser Gordon & Simon Leo & Stevens Reid, 2008. "Public vs. Private Good Research at Land-Grant Universities," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-31, December.
    7. James S. Shortle & Andrew Laughland, 1994. "Impacts Of Taxes To Reduce Agrichemical Use When Farm Policy Is Endogenous," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 3-14, January.
    8. Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2001. "Agrarpolitik als Management öffentlicher Güter: Zur Ökonomik der dezentralen Bereitstellung von Natur in der Kulturlandschaft," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 50(03), pages 1-6.
    9. Schroder, William R. & Mavondo, Felix, 1996. "The Government Agribusiness Interface: a Review of Conceptual Issues and Viewpoints for the Australian Food Manufacturing Sector," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 64(02), pages 1-10, August.
    10. Greenville, Jared W. & MacAulay, T. Gordon, 2006. "Protected Areas and the Management of Fisheries: An Institutional Perspective," 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia 139739, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    11. Bullock, David S., 2005. "Should We Expect Government Policy to Be Pareto Efficient?: The Consequences of an Arrow-Debreu Economy with Violable Property Rights," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19444, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Lyons, R. F. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L. K., 1992. "Disruption and Continuity in Bulgaria's Agrarian Reform," Staff General Research Papers Archive 728, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Bar-Nahum, Ziv & Reznik, Ami & Finkelshtain, Israel & Kan, Iddo, 2022. "Centralized water management under lobbying: Economic analysis of desalination in Israel," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

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