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Sorting on the labour market: A literature overview and theoretical framework

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  • Hornig, Stephan O.
  • Rottmann, Horst
  • Wapler, Rüdiger

Abstract

In the literature there are basically two main approaches that explain the positive link between the level of education and wages: the human-capital theory and the signalling/screening (collectively known as sorting) theory. We highlight the similarity and differences between these theories and present a general theoretical model of screening with productivity-enhancing effects of education from which we derive four empirically testable hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Hornig, Stephan O. & Rottmann, Horst & Wapler, Rüdiger, 2011. "Sorting on the labour market: A literature overview and theoretical framework," Weidener Diskussionspapiere 27, University of Applied Sciences Amberg-Weiden (OTH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hawdps:27
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miller, Paul W. & Mulvey, Charles & Martin, Nick, 2004. "A test of the sorting model of education in Australia," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 473-482, October.
    2. Kübler, Dorothea & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2008. "Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 219-236, September.
    3. Hogan, Vincent & Walker, Ian, 2007. "Education choice under uncertainty: Implications for public policy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 894-912, December.
    4. Fredland, J. Eric & Little, Roger D., 1981. "Self-employed workers: Returns to education and training," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 315-337, June.
    5. Andrew Weiss, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-154, Fall.
    6. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-1047.
    7. Hanming Fang, 2006. "Disentangling The College Wage Premium: Estimating A Model With Endogenous Education Choices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1151-1185, November.
    8. Grubb, W. Norton, 1993. "Further tests of screening on education and observed ability," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-136, June.
    9. Lee, Kiong-Hock, 1980. "Screening, ability, and the productivity of education in Malaysia," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 189-193.
    10. Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1977. "Education and Screening," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 949-958, December.
    11. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2006. "A Test of Screening Discrimination with Employer Learning," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 59(2), pages 267-284, January.
    12. Fabian Lange, 2007. "The Speed of Employer Learning," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-35.
    13. Steffen Habermalz, 2011. "The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(7), pages 607-610.
    14. Miller, Paul W & Mulvey, Charles & Martin, Nick, 1995. "What Do Twins Studies Reveal about the Economic Returns to Education? A Comparison of Australian and U.S. Findings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 586-599, June.
    15. Lofstrom, Magnus, 2000. "A Comparison of the Human Capital and Signaling Models: The Case of the Self-Employed and the Increase in the Schooling Premium in the 1980's," IZA Discussion Papers 160, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Miller, Paul W & Volker, Paul A, 1984. "The Screening Hypothesis: An Application of the Wiles Test," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(1), pages 121-127, January.
    17. Jacobs, Bas, 2007. "Real options and human capital investment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 913-925, December.
    18. Harley Frazis, 2002. "Human capital, signaling, and the pattern of returns to education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 298-320, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    human-capital theory; signalling; screening;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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