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On strike insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Schnabel, Claus

Abstract

A strike insurance is integrated into a model based on one-sided private information of the firm. It is shown that the strike insurance will increase the dispute level if payments to the insurance are lump-sum or if payments from the insurance are proportional to wages. However, if wages affect contributions or if firms receive lump-sum transfers in the case of a dispute, strike activity will fall. Information on the extent of employer strike funds and union strike pay in 16 OECD countries is used to test whether their existence influences strike volume. Regression analyses for the period 1970 to 1996 and for three sub-periods show that while the existence of union strike pay schemes tends to reduce strike volume, countries with strike funds provided by employers' peak confederations are characterised by more strike activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Goerke, Laszlo & Schnabel, Claus, 2002. "On strike insurance," Discussion Papers 12, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:12
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kohaut, Susanne & Schnabel, Claus, 2003. "Verbreitung, Ausmaß und Determinanten der übertariflichen Entlohnung," Discussion Papers 23, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    2. Zagelmeyer, Stefan, 2003. "Die Entwicklung kollektiver Verhandlungen in Großbritannien: ein historischer Überblick," Discussion Papers 17, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    3. Haltiwanger, John & Jarmin, Ron & Schank, Thorsten, 2003. "Productivity, investment in ICT and market experimentation: micro evidence from Germany und the US," Discussion Papers 19, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    4. Knabe, Andreas, 2009. "Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 161-176, March.
    5. Niederalt, Michael, 2003. "Betriebliche Ausbildung als kollektives Phänomen," Discussion Papers 20, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    6. Schank, Thorsten & Schnabel, Claus, 2004. "Betriebliche Determinanten des Überstundeneinsatzes," Discussion Papers 24, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; employer strike insurance; OECD; strike pay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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