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Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity

Author

Listed:
  • Francis K. Cheung
  • Carl Davidson

Abstract

In this paper, the authors examine the nature of the relationship between bargaining structure and strike activity. In particular, they focus on the implications of the fact that the amount of information revealed by a union's actions depends on the bargaining environment in which it operates. The authors demonstrate that a union representing workers of more than one firm will face a greater incentive to reject offers than an independent union. This implies that a merger of two unions or the formation of bargaining coalitions will lead to a greater level of strike activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis K. Cheung & Carl Davidson, 1991. "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 345-371, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:2:p:345-71
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2010. "The case for the virtual strike," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 9(1), pages 75-75, April.
    2. Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2010. "Market integration and strike activity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 154-161, May.
    3. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 19-40, February.
    4. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 353-374, May.
    5. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2005. "Strategic union delegation and strike activity," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 149-173, February.
    6. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
    7. Goerke, Laszlo, 1997. "A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure," Discussion Papers, Series II 357, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    8. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Product Market Integration, Wage Bargaining and Strike Activity," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2001022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    9. Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2003. "Market competition and strike activity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 737-758, May.
    10. Kuhn, Peter & Gu, Wulong, 1998. "Centralization and strikes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 243-265, September.
    11. Goerke, Laszlo & Schnabel, Claus, 2002. "On strike insurance," Discussion Papers 12, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    12. Anthony Y. Baah & Barry Reilly, 2009. "An Empirical Analysis of Strike Durations in Ghana from 1980 to 2004," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 23(3), pages 459-479, September.
    13. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2002. "Striking Features of the Labor Market," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2002/08, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    14. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 25-53.
    15. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Case for Virtual Strike.An Appraisal of the Italian Proposal," Econometica Working Papers wp08, Econometica.
    16. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 1-24.

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