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Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location

Author

Listed:
  • Tim Friehe

    (University of Bonn)

  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

This paper incorporates the reality that the bulk of law enforcement is decentralized while sanctions are chosen centrally, and explores the implications for the socially optimal sanction level. The presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive law enforcement incentives at the local level. We show that the adverse repercussions of uncoordinated enforcement decisions at the local level may be ameliorated by setting a nonmaximal sanction at the central level. In other words, we establish that the decentralization of law enforcement may effectively constrain socially optimal sanction levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam & Miceli, Thomas J., 2018. "Law enforcement in a federal system: Endogenous timing of decentralized enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 134-141.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime; deterrence; federalism; spillovers; optimal sanctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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