Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities
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- Xu, Chenyang & Veld, Klaas van ’t, 2019. "Social influence and economic incentives: Complements or substitutes?—The case of fighting crimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 80-84.
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Keywords
Law enforcement Externalities Neighborhood effects Multiple equilibria Risk dominance;Statistics
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