The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(2), pages 169-169.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017.
"The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(2), pages 249-271, February.
- Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "The efficiency of crackdowns: A lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations," Post-Print halshs-01183366, HAL.
- Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Public Transportations," Working Papers halshs-01270808, HAL.
- Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Public Transportations," Working Papers 1607, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "The efficiency of crackdowns: A lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations," Post-Print halshs-01183369, HAL.
- Bård Harstad & Torben K. Mideksa, 2017.
"Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1708-1734.
- Bård Harstad & Torben Mideksa, 2015. "Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series 5334, CESifo.
- Boyd, Colin, 2020. "Revisiting the foundations of fare evasion research," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 313-324.
- Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
- Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, 2005.
"The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules,"
The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 207-237, January.
- G. Dari Mattiacci & G.G.A. de Geest, 2004. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," Working Papers 04-17, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Hans-Bernd Schäfer, 2008. "Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 72-75, March.
- Éric Langlais, 2010.
"Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(2), pages 263-280.
- Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ? [Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006.
"Competition Policy With Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead Of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule Of Reason”,"
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-244.
- Arndt Christiansen and Wolfgang Kerber & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason"," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200606, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-61, July.
- Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015.
"Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Bonaventura, Luigi & Orlando, Danilo, 2007. "Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance," MPRA Paper 14686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 141-157, February.
- Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "The efficiency of crackdowns. An experiment in public transportations," Post-Print halshs-01335686, HAL.
- Zoltán Szücs, 2024. "Economie du policing – le cas d’une police de tranquillité publique, la nouvelle police municipale de Paris," EconomiX Working Papers 2024-15, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Suurmond, Guido, 2007. "The effects of the enforcement strategy," MPRA Paper 21142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leshem, Shmuel & Tabbach, Avraham, 2023. "The option value of record-based sanctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 1-22.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2016. "Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 73-103.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2022.
"Does the Bomb-crater Effect Really Exist? Evidence from the Laboratory,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 87-111.
- Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2021. "Does the “bomb crater” effect really exist? Evidence from the laboratory," Working Papers 2118, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Ulrich Blum & Nicole Steinat & Michael Veltins, 2008. "On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 209-229, June.
- Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006.
"Bank supervision and corruption in lending,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 2131-2163, November.
- Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2005. "Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending," NBER Working Papers 11498, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
- Boone, J. & Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Other publications TiSEM 19920bcf-0688-4222-9ae8-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2002. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Working Paper Series 2002:21, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Boone, J. & Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2007. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Other publications TiSEM f2b1b916-41f5-4964-bad8-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan C. & Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Working Paper Series 2001:20, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours & Jan C. van Ours, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 616, CESifo.
- Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan C., 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," IZA Discussion Papers 401, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Boone, J. & Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Discussion Paper 2001-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Criminal solicitation, entrapment, and the enforcement of law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 258-268.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009.
"Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises [Strategic default and bankruptcy law],"
MPRA Paper
14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0901, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2009.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprise," Working Papers of BETA 2009-28, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises," Working Papers hal-04140885, HAL.
- Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves & Lee, Lung-Fei, 2011.
"Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?,"
Research Papers in Economics
2011:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Xiaodong Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou & Lung-Fei Lee, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Working Papers 2012.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves & Lee, Lung-Fei, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 128707, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Zenou, Yves & , & Patacchini, Eleonora & Liu, Xiaodong, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Zenou, Yves & , & Patacchini, Eleonora & Liu, Xiaodong, 2011. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006.
"Leniency policies and illegal transactions,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1281-1297, August.
- Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 74, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Buccirossi, Paolo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vasiliki Bageri & Yannis Katsoulacos & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2013.
"The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 545-557, November.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Bageri, Vasiliki & Katsoulacos, Yannis, 2012. "The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue," SITE Working Paper Series 22, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
- Vasiliki Bageri & Yannis Katsoulacos & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2013. "The distortive effects of antitrust fines based on revenue," Working Papers 153, Bank of Greece.
- Katsoulacos, Yannis & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Bageri, Vasiliki, 2013. "The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 9518, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bowles, Roger & Faure, Michael & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 537-549, December.
- Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli, 2005.
"Credible Criminal Enforcement,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 5-15, July.
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "Credible Criminal Enforcement," Working papers 2003-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
- Jean-Baptiste Fleury & Alain Marciano, 2022. "Methodological Individualism and the Foundations of the "Law and Economics" movement," Post-Print hal-03820441, HAL.
- McCrary, Justin & Lee, David S., 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2gh1r30h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Almeida, Rita K. & Carneiro, Pedro, 2005.
"Enforcement of Regulation, Informal Labor and Firm Performance,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1759, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Rita Almeida & Pedro Carneiro, 2006. "Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance," CeMMAP working papers CWP02/06, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Carmen Arguedas, 2008.
"To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October.
- Arguedas, Carmen, 2007. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2007/13, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Emeline Bezin & Thierry Verdier & Yves Zenou, 2022.
"Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 723-760, November.
- Zenou, Yves & Bezin, Emeline & Verdier, Thierry, 2018. "Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emeline Bezin & Thierry Verdier & Yves Zenou, 2022. "Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03344049, HAL.
- Emeline Bezin & Thierry Verdier & Yves Zenou, 2022. "Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment," Post-Print halshs-03344049, HAL.
- Riedel, Nadine & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, 2013.
"Asymmetric obligations,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 67-80.
- Riedel, Nadine & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, 2011. "Asymmetric obligations," FZID Discussion Papers 28-2011, University of Hohenheim, Center for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID).
- Nadine Riedel & Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch, 2011. "Asymmetric Obligations," Working Papers 1110, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Nadine Riedel & Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch, 2011. "Asymmetric Obligations," CESifo Working Paper Series 3450, CESifo.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "Collective Responsibility," Working papers 2013-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:209-218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.