Preventive enforcement
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.005
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015.
"Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Doménech-Pascual, Gabriel & Jiménez, Juan Luis, 2024. "Changes in damages when liability rules change: an empirical study on compensation for the time spent in pretrial detention," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
- Friehe, Tim & Do, Vu Mai Linh, 2023. "Do crime victims lose trust in others? Evidence from Germany," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Optimal law enforcement; Preventive enforcement; Non-preventive enforcement;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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