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Public law enforcement under ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Bertrand Chopard

    (LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité)

  • Marie Obidzinski

    (CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas)

Abstract

In real life situations, potential offenders may only have a vague idea of their own probability of getting caught and possibly, convicted. As they have beliefs regarding this probability, they may exhibit optimism or pessimism. Thus there exists a discrepancy between the objective expected fine and the subjective expected fine. In this context, we investigate how the fact that the choice whether or not to commit an harmful act is framed as a decision under ambiguity can modify the standard Beckerian results regarding the optimal fine and the optimal resources that should be invested in detection and conviction.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Chopard & Marie Obidzinski, 2021. "Public law enforcement under ambiguity," Post-Print hal-04034950, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04034950
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105977
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04034950
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    2. Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & Dietrich Earnhart, 2022. "The role of experience in deterring crime: A theory of specific versus general deterrence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1833-1853, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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