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Law enforcement with motivated agents

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  • Yahagi, Ken

Abstract

This paper provides a law enforcement framework through which to consider principal-agent relations among citizens, an elected official, and a law enforcer. This paper investigates how citizens’ interests are reflected in political competitions in terms of the use of financial incentives, e.g., the allocation of fine revenues, to control the intrinsically motivated law enforcer. This paper points out the limitation of using financial incentives to fully internalize society members’ interest in the enforcer's behavior from a normative perspective. Even if appropriate financial incentives are available, these cannot be chosen under political competitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000065
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105982
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    Cited by:

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    2. Florian Baumann & Sophie Bienenstock & Tim Friehe & Maiva Ropaul, 2023. "Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 229-255, September.
    3. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial incentives; Law enforcement; Punitiveness; Intrinsic motivation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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