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Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences

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  • Edi Karni
  • Zvi Safra

Abstract

Analyzing the optimal bidding behaviour in ascending-bid auctions and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values, we show that expected utility maximizing behaviour is equivalent to: (a) dynamically consistent bidding in ascending-bid auctions; (b) the equivalence of the optimal bids in ascending-bid auctions and in second-price sealed-bid auctions; (c) bidding the value of the object in second-price sealed-bid auctions. In addition, the optimal bid in ascending-bid auctions equals the value of the object if and only if the bidder's preferences on lotteries are both quasi-concave and quasi-convex.

Suggested Citation

  • Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(3), pages 421-433.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:56:y:1989:i:3:p:421-433.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John D. Hey & Gianna Lotito, 2018. "Naive, resolute or sophisticated? A study of dynamic decision making," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Experiments in Economics Decision Making and Markets, chapter 11, pages 275-299, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Ho-Chyuan Chen & William Neilson, 1999. "Pure-strategy Equilibria with Non-expected Utility Players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 201-212, April.
    3. Levin, Dan & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2004. "Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 229-251, October.
    4. Hurley, Sean P. & Kliebenstein, James B., 2003. "Interpreting Bids From A Vickrey Auction When There Are Public Good Attributes," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21965, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Ferreira J. -L. & Gilboa I. & Maschler M., 1995. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 284-317, August.
    6. Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
    7. Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 2022. "Hybrid decision model and the ranking of experiments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    8. Auster, Sarah & Kellner, Christian, 2022. "Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    9. , & , & ,, 2006. "Optimal auctions with ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 411-438, December.
    10. von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2021. "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    11. Han Bleichrodt & José-Luis Pinto-Prades, 2004. "The Validity of QALYs Under Non-Expected Utility," Working Papers 113, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. A. Nebout, 2014. "Sequential decision making without independence: a new conceptual approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 85-110, June.
    13. Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup, 2009. "A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2084-2114, September.
    14. Soham R. Phade & Venkat Anantharam, 2021. "Mechanism Design for Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Agents: A General Framework and the Revelation Principle," Papers 2101.08722, arXiv.org.
    15. Evren, Özgür, 2019. "Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 285-307.
    16. Lotito, Gianna, 2007. "Resolute Choice in interaction: a qualitative experiment," POLIS Working Papers 94, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    17. A. Nebout & D. Dubois, 2014. "When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the common ratio effect," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 19-49, February.
    18. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 231-237, July.
    19. Hong, Chew Soo & Nishimura, Naoko, 2003. "Revenue non-equivalence between the English and the second-price auctions: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 443-458, August.
    20. Robert Lapson, 1992. "Expected Value," Discussion Papers 1037, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    21. Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2022. "Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    22. Karni, Edi & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2015. "Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    23. Daniel R. Burghart, 2020. "The two faces of independence: betweenness and homotheticity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(4), pages 567-593, May.
    24. Ormiston, Michael B. & E. Schlee, Edward, 1999. "Comparative statics tests between decision models under risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 145-166, October.
    25. Dillenberger, David & Raymond, Collin, 2019. "On the consensus effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 384-416.

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