José Luis Ferreira
(Jose Luis Ferreira)

Personal Details

First Name:	Jose Luis
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Ferreira
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pfe137
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	http://www.eco.uc3m.es/personal/info_contacto/jlferr.html
Twitter:	@jl_ferr

Affiliation

Departamento de Economía
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Madrid, Spain
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/
RePEc:edi:deuc3es (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Rassenti, Stephen, 2010. "The effect of experience in Cournot play," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1024, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

   Cited by:

   1. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2016. "Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, July.

2. Rassenti, Stephen, 2010. "Multiple openings of forward markets: experimental evidence," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1023, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

   Cited by:

   1. van Koten, Silvester & Ortmann, Andreas, 2013. "Structural versus behavioral remedies in the deregulation of electricity markets: An experimental investigation motivated by policy concerns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 256-265.
      • Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2011. "Structural versus Behavioral Remedies in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets: An Experimental Investigation Guided by Theory and Policy Concerns," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp437, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
      • Silvester van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2012. "Structural versus Behavioral Remedies in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets: An Experimental Investigation Guided by Theory and Policy Concerns," Discussion Papers 2012-36, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
      • Silvester van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2011. "Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets: An Experimental Investigation Guided by Theory and Policy Concerns," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/07, European University Institute.
   2. Schubert, Jens, 2015. "The impact of forward contracting on tacit collusion: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 109-123.
   3. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2016. "Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, July.
   4. Schubert, Jens, 2013. "The Impact of Forward Trading on Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 43768, University Library of Munich, Germany.

3. Rassenti, Stephen, 2009. "The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence," UC3M Working papers. Economics we092616, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

   Cited by:

   1. van Koten, Silvester & Ortmann, Andreas, 2013. "Structural versus behavioral remedies in the deregulation of electricity markets: An experimental investigation motivated by policy concerns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 256-265.
      • Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2011. "Structural versus Behavioral Remedies in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets: An Experimental Investigation Guided by Theory and Policy Concerns," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp437, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
      • Silvester van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2012. "Structural versus Behavioral Remedies in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets: An Experimental Investigation Guided by Theory and Policy Concerns," Discussion Papers 2012-36, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
      • Silvester van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2011. "Structural versus Behavioral Measures in the Deregulation of Electricity Markets: An Experimental Investigation Guided by Theory and Policy Concerns," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/07, European University Institute.
   2. Remco van Eijkel & Jose Luis Moraga, 2010. "Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   3. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "Allaz-Vila competition with non-linear costs or demands," MPRA Paper 41772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   4. Andrea Petrella & Sandro Sapio, 2010. "No PUN intended: A time series analysis of the Italian day-ahead electricity prices," RSCAS Working Papers 2010/03, European University Institute.

4. Corcho, Paula, 2001. "Generalized externality games," UC3M Working papers. Economics we015417, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
   • Paula Corcho & José Ferreira, 2003. "Generalized externality games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 163-184, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Josep Maria Izquierdo & Carlos Rafels, 2020. "Core Allocations in Co-investment Problems," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1157-1180, December.

5. Ferreira, José Luis, 2001. "The role of observability in futures markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we015316, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

   Cited by:

   1. Le Coq, Chloe & Orzen, Henrik, 2006. "Do forward markets enhance competition?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 415-431, November.
      • Le Coq, Chloé & Orzen, Henrik, 2002. "Do Forward Markets Enhance Competition? Experimental Evidence," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 506, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 01 Oct 2004.

6. Ferreira, José Luis, 2000. "Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7273, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

   Cited by:

   1. Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 236-266.
      • Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Working Paper Series 937, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, B., 2012. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1252, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
      • Pär Holmberg & Bert Willems, 2012. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Working Papers EPRG 1224, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Other publications TiSEM 29ee1be9-d566-4b3b-9ba0-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Discussion Paper 2012-088, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Holmberg, Par & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation : Committing to a negative supply slope," Other publications TiSEM e39e21c0-d1d3-495e-83c5-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Other publications TiSEM 2d1fb9b4-fb84-44ab-92e9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Discussion Paper 2012-039, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
   2. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 2003. "Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 141-151, January.
   3. Ferreira, José Luis, 2001. "The role of observability in futures markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we015316, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

7. Ferreira, J.L. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Papers 9217, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Ferreira J. -L. & Gilboa I. & Maschler M., 1995. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 284-317, August.
   • J.L. Ferreira, 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Papers 988, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Ferreira, J. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M.B., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Paper 1992-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

   Cited by:

   1. Jonathan Shalev, 2000. "Loss aversion equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(2), pages 269-287.
      • SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Loss aversion equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
      • Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Loss Aversion Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Jul 1997.
      • SHALEV, Jonathan, 2000. "Loss aversion equilibrium," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1456, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   2. Corcho, Paula, 1997. "Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6025, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
      • P. Corcho Sánchez & J.L. Ferreira García, 1998. "Credible equilibria in non-finite games and ingames without perfect recall," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 84(0), pages 167-185, December.
   3. Jonathan Shalev, 1998. "Loss Aversion in Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 9802005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Loss aversion in repeated games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   4. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.
   5. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   6. Itzhak Gilboa, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Post-Print hal-00753134, HAL.
      • Gilboa, Itzhak, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-30, July.
   7. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Ismael Martinez-Martinez, 2014. "Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players," PSE Working Papers hal-01095472, HAL.

8. Jose Luis Ferreira, 1990. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 896, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Ferreira, Jos e Luis, 1996. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 249-257, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Delgado, Juan, 2005. "Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints," UC3M Working papers. Economics we052314, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
      • Juan Delgado, 2006. "Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 219-229, September.
   2. Lemus Torres, Ana Belén, 2019. "Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books under the Arm's Length Principle," UC3M Working papers. Economics 28676, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
      • Lemus, Ana B. & Moreno, Diego, 2020. "Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the Arm’s Length Principle," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 78-90.
   3. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
      • Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis," Experimental 9707001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Clark, K. & Kay, S. & Sefton, M, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing ? An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 97-04, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
   4. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 2001. "Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 303-307, September.
   5. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 1999. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 40-58, January.

Articles

1. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2016. "Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, July.

   Cited by:

   1. Dressler, Luisa, 2016. "Support schemes for renewable electricity in the European Union: Producer strategies and competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 186-196.
      • Luisa Dressler, 2014. "Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the European Union: Producer Strategies and Competition," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-54, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
   2. Caleb Cox & Arzé Karam & Matthias Pelster, 2022. "Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(1), pages 29-62, February.

2. Ferreira, José Luis, 2014. "Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 362-364.

   Cited by:

   1. David P. Brown & David E. M. Sappington, 2023. "Employing gain-sharing regulation to promote forward contracting in the electricity sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 30-56, April.
      • Brown, David P. & Sappington, David E. M., 2022. "Employing Gain-Sharing Regulation to Promote Forward Contracting in the Electricity Sector," Working Papers 2022-10, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
   2. David P. Brown and Andrew Eckert, 2020. "Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 61-88.
      • David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2020. "Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(4), pages 61-88, July.
      • Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew, 2018. "Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies," Working Papers 2018-12, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
   3. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew, 2016. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Working Papers 2016-8, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
      • David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2018. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-137, February.

3. José Luis Ferreira & Roberts Waddle, 2010. "Strategic profit sharing between firms," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 341-354, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

4. Ferreira José Luis, 2006. "The Role of Observability in Futures Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, June.

   Cited by:

   1. David Newbery, 2009. "Predicting Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 3, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
      • David Newbery, 2008. "Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets," Working Papers EPRG 0821, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
      • David Newbery, 2009. "Predicting Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets," RSCAS Working Papers 2009/03, European University Institute.
      • Newbery, D., 2008. "Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0837, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
   2. Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 236-266.
      • Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Working Paper Series 937, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, B., 2012. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1252, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
      • Pär Holmberg & Bert Willems, 2012. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Working Papers EPRG 1224, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Other publications TiSEM 29ee1be9-d566-4b3b-9ba0-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Discussion Paper 2012-088, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Holmberg, Par & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation : Committing to a negative supply slope," Other publications TiSEM e39e21c0-d1d3-495e-83c5-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Other publications TiSEM 2d1fb9b4-fb84-44ab-92e9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Discussion Paper 2012-039, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
   3. ABADA, Ibrahim & EHRENMANN, Andreas & SMEERS, Yves, 2014. "Endogenizing long-term contracts in gas market models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   4. Pär Holmberg, 2011. "Strategic Forward Contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 169-202.
   5. Hesamzadeh, M.R. & Biggar, D.R. & Bunn, D.W. & Moiseeva, E., 2020. "The impact of generator market power on the electricity hedge market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
   6. Lenhard, Severin, 2022. "Imperfect competition with costly disposal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
   7. Remco van Eijkel & Jose Luis Moraga, 2010. "Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   8. Adilov, Nodir, 2012. "Strategic use of forward contracts and capacity constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 164-173.
   9. Lenhard, Severin, 2022. "Imperfect Competition with Costly Disposal," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264038, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   10. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallac, 2014. "Analysis Of The Strategic Use Of Forward Contracting In Electricity Markets," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 129, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
       • Miguel Vazquez, 2012. "Analysis of the strategic use of forward contracting in electricity markets," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/13, European University Institute.
   11. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2016. "Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, July.
   12. Sebastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2017. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Working Papers 1708, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
       • Sébastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2020. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 789-828, April.
   13. Nathan H. Miller & Joseph U. Podwol, 2020. "Forward Contracts, Market Structure and the Welfare Effects of Mergers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 364-407, June.

5. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 2003. "Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 141-151, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Wölfing, Nikolas, 2019. "Forward trading and collusion in supply functions," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-003, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
   2. Ferreira, José Luis, 2014. "Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 362-364.
   3. James Bushnell, 2007. "Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 225-245, December.
      • Bushnell, James, 2007. "Oligopoly Equilibria in Electricity Contract Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 13135, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   4. Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 236-266.
      • Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Working Paper Series 937, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, B., 2012. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1252, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
      • Pär Holmberg & Bert Willems, 2012. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Working Papers EPRG 1224, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Other publications TiSEM 29ee1be9-d566-4b3b-9ba0-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Discussion Paper 2012-088, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Holmberg, Par & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation : Committing to a negative supply slope," Other publications TiSEM e39e21c0-d1d3-495e-83c5-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Other publications TiSEM 2d1fb9b4-fb84-44ab-92e9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Holmberg, P. & Willems, Bert, 2012. "Relaxing Competition through Speculation : Committing to a Negative Supply Slope," Discussion Paper 2012-039, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
   5. Rassenti, Stephen, 2009. "The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence," UC3M Working papers. Economics we092616, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
   6. Fiuza de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo & Daglish, Toby, 2016. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 11-26.
   7. Green, Richard & Le Coq, Chloé, 2010. "The length of contracts and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 21-29, January.
   8. Remco van Eijkel & Jose Luis Moraga, 2010. "Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   9. van Eijkel, Remco & Moraga-González, Jose L., 2010. "Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas," IESE Research Papers D/864, IESE Business School.
      • Remco van Eijkel & José Luis Moraga Gonzalez, 2010. "Do Firms Sell Forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," CESifo Working Paper Series 3270, CESifo.
      • van Eijkel, Remco & Kuper, Gerard H. & Moraga-González, José L., 2016. "Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-35.
   10. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2001. "Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory," Vienna Economics Papers vie0110, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
       • Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, 2004. "Cournot versus Walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-217, February.
   11. Breitmoser, Yves, 2010. "A general model of oligopoly endogenizing Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, and Allaz-Vila," MPRA Paper 19998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   12. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "Allaz-Vila competition with non-linear costs or demands," MPRA Paper 41772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   13. Van Moer, Geert, 2019. "Electricity market competition when forward contracts are pairwise efficient," MPRA Paper 96660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   14. Dressler, Luisa, 2016. "Support schemes for renewable electricity in the European Union: Producer strategies and competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 186-196.
       • Luisa Dressler, 2014. "Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the European Union: Producer Strategies and Competition," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-54, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
   15. Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Financial contracts as coordination device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 241-259, April.
       • Le Coq, Chloe & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2019. "Financial Contracts as Coordination Device," SITE Working Paper Series 47, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
       • Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Financial contracts as coordination device," Post-Print hal-04129332, HAL.
   16. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallac, 2014. "Analysis Of The Strategic Use Of Forward Contracting In Electricity Markets," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 129, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
       • Miguel Vazquez, 2012. "Analysis of the strategic use of forward contracting in electricity markets," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/13, European University Institute.
   17. de Frutos, María-Ángeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2012. "How to allocate forward contracts: The case of electricity markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 451-469.
   18. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2016. "Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, July.
   19. Fabra, Natalia & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   20. Ferreira, José Luis, 2001. "The role of observability in futures markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we015316, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
   21. Breitmoser, Yves, 2013. "Increasing marginal costs are strategically beneficial in forward trading," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 109-112.
   22. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2016. "Option contracts in a vertical industry," MPRA Paper 79241, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Apr 2017.
       • Manel Antelo & Lluís Bru, 2018. "Option Contracts in a Vertical Industry," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 86(4), pages 533-557, July.
   23. Schubert, Jens, 2013. "The Impact of Forward Trading on Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 43768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   24. Friedel Bolle & Yves Breitmoser, 2011. "Transaction Costs and Capacity Costs as Interrelated Determinants of Vertical Integration in Oligopolies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 266-290, June.
   25. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "On the endogeneity of Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 16-29.
   26. Sebastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2017. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Working Papers 1708, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
       • Sébastien Mitraille & Henry Thille, 2020. "Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 789-828, April.
   27. Daron Acemoglu, Ali Kakhbod, and Asuman Ozdaglar, 2017. "Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Energy Sources," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(KAPSARC S).
   28. Nathan H. Miller & Joseph U. Podwol, 2020. "Forward Contracts, Market Structure and the Welfare Effects of Mergers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 364-407, June.
   29. Alfredo Garcia & Zhijiang Shen, 2010. "Equilibrium Capacity Expansion Under Stochastic Demand Growth," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 30-42, February.
   30. Guy Meunier, 2011. "Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from Theoretical Models," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
   31. de Braganca, Gabriel Fiuza & Daglish, Toby, 2012. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?," Working Paper Series 19239, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.

6. Paula Corcho & José Ferreira, 2003. "Generalized externality games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 163-184, March.
   • Corcho, Paula, 2001. "Generalized externality games," UC3M Working papers. Economics we015417, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 1999. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 40-58, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Tao, Yong & Lin, Li & Wang, Hanjie & Hou, Chen, 2023. "Superlinear growth and the fossil fuel energy sustainability dilemma: Evidence from six continents," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 39-51.
   2. Samir Aknine & Suzanne Pinson & Melvin F. Shakun, 2004. "A Multi-Agent Coalition Formation Method Based on Preference Models," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 13(6), pages 513-538, November.
   3. Dhillon, Upinder S. & Noe, Thomas H. & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 2001. "Bond calls, credible commitment, and equity dilution: a theoretical and clinical analysis of simultaneous tender and call (STAC) offers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 573-611, May.

8. Ferreira, Jos e Luis, 1996. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 249-257, January.
   • Jose Luis Ferreira, 1990. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 896, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   See citations under working paper version above.
9. Ferreira J. -L. & Gilboa I. & Maschler M., 1995. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 284-317, August.
   • J.L. Ferreira, 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Papers 988, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Ferreira, J.L. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Papers 9217, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Ferreira, J. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M.B., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Paper 1992-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   See citations under working paper version above.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2010-10-23 2010-12-23
2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2009-04-25 2010-10-23
3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2018-09-24 2018-10-01
4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2010-12-23
5. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2018-09-24
6. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (1) 2010-12-23
7. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (1) 2010-12-23
8. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2010-12-23
9. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2018-09-24
10. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2010-12-23
11. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2010-10-23
12. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (1) 2018-09-24
13. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2009-04-25

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