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Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

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  • Asheim, G.B.

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such refinement is offred through an analysis based on Greenberg's "theory of social situations". A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of colective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

Suggested Citation

  • Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 1996_020, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_020
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alvin E. Roth, 1976. "Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 1(1), pages 43-49, February.
    2. R. A. Pollak, 1968. "Consistent Planning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(2), pages 201-208.
    3. Bergin James & MacLeod W. Bentley, 1993. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 42-73, October.
    4. Nalebuff, B. & Shubik, M., 1988. "Revenge And Rational Play," Papers 138, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    5. Bezalel Peleg & Menahem E. Yaari, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401.
    6. Dekel, Eddie & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 299-303, December.
    7. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    8. Geir B. Asheim, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 427-443.
    9. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
    10. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
    11. Steven M. Goldman, 1980. "Consistent Plans," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(3), pages 533-537.
    12. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August.
    13. Bennett, E. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games," Other publications TiSEM ef13c9a9-3db6-4939-96ef-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1987. "On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 55-75, October.
    15. Geir B. Asheim, 1988. "Rawlsian Intergenerational Justice as a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a Resource Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(3), pages 469-483.
    16. Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
    17. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    18. Asheim, Geir B., 1991. "Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 278-294, August.
    19. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Renegotiation-Proofness In Finite And Infinite Stage Games Through The Theory Of Social Situations," Papers 04-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
    20. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
    21. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    22. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY; OPTIMISTIC STABILITY;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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