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On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games

Author

Listed:
  • Zhengxing Zou

    (Beijing Jiaotong University and University of Toronto)

  • René van den Brink

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Yukihiko Funaki

    (Waseda University)

Abstract

We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize the family of all weighted-egalitarian values by employing the standard axioms of efficiency and linearity, in addition to two novel axioms: ω-ratio invariance for symmetric players and symmetry in weights. We then show that relaxing linearity to additivity and adding coalitional monotonicity results in a sub- family of affine combinations of equal division and weighted division values. Furthermore, using an axiom called monotonicity in weights, we characterize the family of convex combinations of equal division and weighted division values.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhengxing Zou & René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2024. "On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 24-021/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240021
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    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/24021.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative game; axiomatization; equal division value; weighted division value; equality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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