IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v183y2019ic8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Players’ nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values

Author

Listed:
  • Kongo, Takumi

Abstract

We axiomatize the class of weighted (surplus) division values, that is, a generalization of the equal (surplus) division value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. From the set of axioms that characterizes the equal (surplus) division value, we replace an axiom with its qualitative generalization and the other axiom with a slightly stronger one.

Suggested Citation

  • Kongo, Takumi, 2019. "Players’ nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:8
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108539
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176519302642
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108539?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Casajus, André, 2018. "Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 105-123.
    2. Takumi Kongo, 2018. "Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(01), pages 1-14, March.
    3. André Casajus, 2011. "Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 163-174, August.
    4. Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2014. "Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 162-172.
    5. Casajus, André, 2019. "Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 75-78.
    6. Koji Yokote & Yukihiko Funaki, 2017. "Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 171-203, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zou, Zhengxing & van den Brink, René, 2020. "Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    3. Takumi Kongo, 2020. "Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(3), pages 199-213, December.
    4. Li, Wenzhong & Xu, Genjiu & van den Brink, René, 2024. "Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    5. Zhengxing Zou & René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2024. "On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 24-021/II, Tinbergen Institute.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Takumi Kongo, 2024. "Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 338(2), pages 973-989, July.
    2. Dhrubajit Choudhury & Surajit Borkotokey & Rajnish Kumar & Sudipta Sarangi, 2021. "The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 55-63, June.
    3. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    4. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Adriana Navarro‐Ramos & Philippe Solal, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 787-816, December.
    5. Koji Yokote & Takumi Kongo & Yukihiko Funaki, 2021. "Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 81-98, July.
    6. Li, Wenzhong & Xu, Genjiu & van den Brink, René, 2024. "Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    7. Zou, Zhengxing & van den Brink, René, 2020. "Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    8. Takaaki Abe & Satoshi Nakada, 2018. "Generalized Potentials, Value, and Core," Discussion Paper Series DP2018-19, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    9. Takumi Kongo, 2020. "Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(3), pages 199-213, December.
    10. Borkotokey, Surajit & Choudhury, Dhrubajit & Kumar, Rajnish & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2020. "Consolidating Marginalism and Egalitarianism: A New Value for Transferable Utility Games," QBS Working Paper Series 2020/12, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    11. van den Brink, René & Núñez, Marina & Robles, Francisco, 2021. "Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    12. Manfred Besner, 2020. "Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 851-873, September.
    13. Takumi Kongo, 2018. "Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(01), pages 1-14, March.
    14. Surajit Borkotokey & Dhrubajit Choudhury & Rajnish Kumar & Sudipta Sarangi, 2023. "A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 830-854, December.
    15. Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2021. "Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 302(1), pages 23-47, July.
    16. Sylvain Béal & Florian Navarro, 2020. "Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies," Working Papers 2020-01, CRESE.
    17. Abe, Takaaki, 2024. "Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
    18. Takaaki Abe & Satoshi Nakada, 2023. "Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 523-543, May.
    19. Abe, Takaaki & Nakada, Satoshi, 2023. "The in-group egalitarian Owen values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 1-16.
    20. Koji Yokote & Takumi Kongo & Yukihiko Funaki, 2019. "Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(2), pages 197-212, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    TU game; Axiomatization; Weighted division value; Nullification;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.