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How to Divide When There Isn't Enough

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  • Thomson,William

Abstract

How to Divide When There Isn't Enough develops a rigorous yet accessible presentation of the state-of-the-art for the adjudication of conflicting claims and the theory of taxation. It covers all aspects one may wish to know about claims problems: the most important rules, the most important axioms, and how these two sets are related. More generally, it also serves as an introduction to the modern theory of economic design, which in the last twenty years has revolutionized many areas of economics, generating a wide range of applicable allocations rules that have improved people's lives in many ways. In developing the theory, the book employs a variety of techniques that will appeal to both experts and non-experts. Compiling decades of research into a single framework, William Thomson provides numerous applications that will open a large number of avenues for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomson,William, 2019. "How to Divide When There Isn't Enough," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107194625.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781107194625
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Moretti & Raja Trabelsi, 2021. "A Double-Weighted Bankruptcy Method to Allocate CO2 Emissions Permits," Post-Print hal-03835536, HAL.
    2. Salonia, Enrico Mattia, 2024. "A Foundation for Universalisation in Games," TSE Working Papers 24-1586, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Josep E. Peris & Begoña Subiza, 2022. "A claims problem approach to the cost allocation of a minimum cost spanning tree," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 2785-2801, July.
    4. Duro, Juan Antonio & Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Vilella, Cori, 2020. "The allocation of CO2 emissions as a claims problem," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    5. Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2022. "A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    6. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Foroogh Salekpay & Cori Vilella, 2023. "How to distribute the European regional development funds through a combination of egalitarian allocations: the constrained equal losses min," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, December.
    7. Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2023. "An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2301, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    8. Echenique, Federico & Miralles, Antonio & Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    9. Victor Ginsburgh & Juan D. Moreno‐Ternero, 2022. "Brexit and multilingualism in the European Union," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 708-731, May.
    10. Chatterjee, Siddharth & Ertemel, Sinan & Kumar, Rajnish, 2023. "Rationing rules for risky claims," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    11. Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas, 2024. "Equal treatment of unsatisfied agents," Research Memorandum 010, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    12. Josep M Izquierdo & Carlos Rafels, 2024. "An egalitarian approach for the adjudication of conflicting claims," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2024/470, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Stefano Moretti & Raja Trabelsi, 2021. "A Double-Weighted Bankruptcy Method to Allocate CO 2 Emissions Permits," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-21, October.
    14. Salekpay, Foroogh & Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel, 2022. "How to distribute the ERDF funds through a combination of egalitarian allocations: the CELmin," Working Papers 2072/535073, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    15. Sebastian Cano-Berlanga & María-José Solís-Baltodano & Cori Vilella, 2023. "The Art of Sharing Resources: How to Distribute Water during a Drought Period," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(5), pages 1-16, August.
    16. Salmaso, Pietro, 2024. "Welfare maximization in stable sharing services," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    17. Zou, Zhengxing & Tan, Zhibin, 2023. "Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    18. Bas Dietzenbacher, 2023. "Generalizing the constrained equal awards rule," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 131-150, July.
    19. Duro Moreno, Juan Antonio & Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2022. "Allocating remaining carbon budgets and mitigation costs," Working Papers 2072/535074, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    20. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & M. Carmen Marco-Gil & Juan-Francisco Sánchez-García, 2022. "New empirical insights into conflicting claims problems," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 709-738, December.
    21. Zhengxing Zou & René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2024. "On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 24-021/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    22. Isaac Elishakoff & Avraham N. Dancygier, 2023. "An explicit solution to a game-theoretic bankruptcy problem," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(9), pages 1-16, September.

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