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Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will

Author

Listed:
  • Benoit Crutzen

    (Erasmus School of Economics)

  • Dana Sisak

    (Erasmus School of Economics)

  • Otto Swank

    (Erasmus School of Economics)

Abstract

Two common characteristics of populism are anti-elitism and favoring popular will over expertise. The recent successes of populists are often attributed to the common people, the majority of voters, being left behind by mainstream parties. This paper shows that the two characteristics of populism are responses to the common people being left behind. We develop a model that highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers and knowledge. Numbers give the common people an electoral advantage, knowledge the elite. We show that electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elites interest, creating a left-behind majority. Next, we identify conditions under which a left-behind majority encourages entry by a party offering an anti-elite platform. Finally, we identify conditions under which parties follow the opinion of the common people when that group would benefit from parties relying on experts.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoit Crutzen & Dana Sisak & Otto Swank, 2020. "Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-055/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20200055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Massimo Morelli & Antonio Nicolò & Paolo Roberti, 2021. "A Commitment Theory of Populism," CESifo Working Paper Series 9473, CESifo.
    2. Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2023. "Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism," Discussion Papers 2023-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    3. Luca Bellodi & Massimo Morelli & Antonio Nicolò & Paolo Roberti, 2023. "The Shift to Commitment Politics and Populism:Theory and Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23204, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral competition; Populism; Pandering; Information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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