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Market Power: How Does it Arise? How is it Measured?

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  • Lawrence J. White

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  • Lawrence J. White, 2012. "Market Power: How Does it Arise? How is it Measured?," Working Papers 12-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:12-06
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    File URL: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/2012/White_MarketPowerRiseandMeasure.pdf
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    1. Michael Spence, 1976. "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(2), pages 217-235.
    2. Brannman, Lance & Klein, J Douglass & Weiss, Leonard W, 1987. "The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(1), pages 24-32, February.
    3. Perloff,Jeffrey M. & Karp,Larry S. & Golan,Amos, 2007. "Estimating Market Power and Strategies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521804400.
    4. Jacob A. Bikker & Sherrill Shaffer & Laura Spierdijk, 2012. "Assessing Competition with the Panzar-Rosse Model: The Role of Scale, Costs, and Equilibrium," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 1025-1044, November.
    5. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
    6. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    7. Victor J. Tremblay & Carol Horton Tremblay, 2012. "New Perspectives on Industrial Organization," Springer Texts in Business and Economics, Springer, edition 127, number 978-1-4614-3241-8, April.
    8. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    9. J. Levin & L. Einav., 2012. "Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 1.
    10. Meghan Busse & Marc Rysman, 2005. "Competition and Price Discrimination in Yellow Pages Advertising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 378-390, Summer.
    11. Jan Horst Keppler, 1994. "Luigi Amoroso (1886–1965): Mathematical Economist, Italian Corporatist," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 589-611, Winter.
    12. Franklin M. Fisher, 1987. "On the Misuse of the Profits-Sales Ratio to Infer Monopoly Power," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 384-396, Autumn.
    13. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    14. Nicola Giocoli, 2012. "Who Invented the Lerner Index? Luigi Amoroso, the Dominant Firm Model, and the Measurement of Market Power," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 181-191, November.
    15. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
    16. Lawrence White, 2001. "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(1), pages 23-31, February.
    17. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632.
    18. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
    19. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust," CEPR Discussion Papers 5794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Perloff,Jeffrey M. & Karp,Larry S. & Golan,Amos, 2007. "Estimating Market Power and Strategies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521011143.
    21. Dakshina De Silva & Thomas Jeitschko & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2009. "Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 73-93, September.
    22. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
    23. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    24. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrey E. SHASTITKO & Anna I. MELESHKINA & Kirill V. DOZMAROV, 2019. "Error risks under antitrust law enforcement: Effects of demand and supply shocks," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 10(3), pages 2-3, July.
    2. Chunliang Guo & Jiawen Zhang & Na Li, 2024. "A New Perspective on Strategic Choices for the Survival and Development of Energy Enterprises: An Analysis of Market Power, Innovation Strategy, and Sustainable Development of Major Multinational Oil ," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(7), pages 1-20, April.
    3. Nguyen Thi Tuoi & Nguyen Phu Son & Pham Le Thong, 2021. "Estimating the Market Power of Traders in the Arabica Coffee Value Chain in Lam Dong, Vietnam," International Journal of Economics and Financial Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 7(3), pages 102-108, 09-2021.
    4. Lan, Yanfei & Yan, Haikuan & Ren, Da & Guo, Rui, 2019. "Merger strategies in a supply chain with asymmetric capital-constrained retailers upon market power dependent trade credit," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 299-318.

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