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Job mobility, wage dispersion, and technological change: An asymmetric information perspective

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  • Li, Jin

Abstract

This paper develops a model of job mobility and wage dispersion with asymmetric information. Contrary to existing models in which the superior information of current employers leads to market collapse, this model generates a unique equilibrium outcome in which (a) positive turnover exists and (b) identical workers may be paid differently. The model implies that, in the presence of technological change that is skill-biased and favors general skills over firm-specific skills, the wage distribution becomes more spread out (corresponding to greater inequality) and job mobility increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Jin, 2013. "Job mobility, wage dispersion, and technological change: An asymmetric information perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 105-126.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:60:y:2013:i:c:p:105-126
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.01.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
    2. Heski Bar‐Isaac & Clare Leaver, 2022. "Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Adverse Selection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 849-861, October.
    3. Mussida Chiara & Zanin Luca, 2019. "Voluntary Mobility of Employees for Better Job Opportunities Given a Temporary Contract: Insights Regarding an Age-Varying Association Between the Two Events," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-27, April.
    4. Kevin Lang & Russell Weinstein, 2016. "A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers," NBER Working Papers 22387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 579-614, September.
    6. Jin Li & Jun Yu, 2017. "A Theory Of Turnover And Wage Dynamics," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 223-236, January.
    7. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Talent discovery and poaching under asymmetric information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116044, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Ruslan, Kadir & Sukma, Weni Lidya, 2023. "Employment Formalization in Indonesia: Role of Parents’ Employment Mobility Toward Children’s Employment Mobility," MPRA Paper 120696, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Apr 2023.
    9. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2023. "Talent Discovery and Poaching Under Asymmetric Information," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(649), pages 201-234.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Inequality; Turnover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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