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Signals Sell: Product Lines when Consumers Differ Both in Taste for Quality and Image Concern

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  • Friedrichsen, Jana

    (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

Abstract

This paper analyzes optimal product lines when consumers differ both in their taste for quality and in their desire for social image. The market outcome features partial pooling and product differentiation that is not driven by heterogeneous valuations for quality but by image concerns. A typical monopoly outcome is a two-tier product line resembling a \"masstige\" strategy as observed in luxury goods markets. Products can have identical quality and differ only in price and image, thereby rationalizing quality-equivalent line extensions. Under competition, both average quality and market coverage are (weakly) higher but monopoly can yield higher welfare than competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedrichsen, Jana, 2018. "Signals Sell: Product Lines when Consumers Differ Both in Taste for Quality and Image Concern," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 70, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:70
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    7. Florian H. Schneider, 2020. "Signaling ideology through consumption," ECON - Working Papers 367, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2022.
    8. Heidhues, Paul & Köszegi, Botond, 2018. "Behavioral Industrial Organization," CEPR Discussion Papers 12988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    image concern; conspicuous consumption; two-dimensional screening; nonlinear pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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