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Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

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  • Besley, Timothy
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh

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  • Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2007. "Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1645-1663, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:9:p:1645-1663
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