Optimal auctions with signaling bidders
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- Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021.
"Auctions with signaling concerns,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 420-448, May.
- Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2017. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," MPRA Paper 79181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series 8650, CESifo.
- Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Auctions with signaling concerns," Post-Print hal-04120416, HAL.
- Jibang Wu & Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru & Haifeng Xu, 2021. "Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders," Papers 2109.04888, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
- Roland Bénabou & Armin Falk & Luca Henkel & Jean Tirole, 2020. "Eliciting Moral Preferences: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2020-17, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
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More about this item
Keywords
optimal auctions; revenue equivalence; Bayesian persuasion; information design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2021-03-22 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2021-03-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-03-22 (Microeconomics)
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