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Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly

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  • Jellal, Mohamed

Abstract

In developing countries, empirical evidence suggests that labor unions entail a positive wage gap for unionized workers, in particular in monopolistic and publicly controlled firms. In this paper, we analyze how the presence of a labor union affects the regulation of a monopoly under asymmetric information. Since part of the informational rent left to the monopolistic firm benefits to the syndicate, we prove that the regulator is induced to lower the rent when the union has a large bargaining power. The net consumers' surplus can either increase or decrease with the firm's bargaining power depending on the firm's efficiency type. JEL

Suggested Citation

  • Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly," MPRA Paper 17279, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric Information ; Labor Union ; Monopolistic Firms ; Regulation Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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