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Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly

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  • AURIOL, Emmanuelle
  • PICARD, Pierre M.

Abstract

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds. An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels. However the government can contract ex-post with the private firms. This ex-post contracting set-up allows more flexibility than traditional regulation where government commits to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties.
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Suggested Citation

  • AURIOL, Emmanuelle & PICARD, Pierre M., 2009. "Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2174, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2174
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02291.x
    Note: In : The Economic Journal, 119, 1464-1493, 2009
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    Cited by:

    1. S.N. Silvestrov & N.V. Kuznetsov & V.V. Ponkratov & D.A. Smirnov & N.E. Kotova, 2018. "Investment Development of Russian Regions Backed up by Natural Monopolies," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 89-99.
    2. Pierre M. Picard & Ridwan D. Rusli, 2018. "State‐owned firms and private debt," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 672-702, October.
    3. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M., 2013. "A theory of BOT concession contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 187-209.
    4. Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2023. "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," Working Papers 2023.03, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Jullien, Bruno & Pouyet, Jérôme & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Contracting and Regulation under the Threat of Duplication," IDEI Working Papers 563, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    6. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Blanc, Aymeric, 2009. "Capture and corruption in public utilities: The cases of water and electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-216, June.
    7. Emmanuelle Auriol & Stéphane Straub, 2011. "Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Li, Shuai & Cai, Jiannan & Cai, Hubo, 2019. "Infrastructure privatization analysis: A public-private duopoly game," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 80-87.
    9. Sato, Susumu & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2019. "Shadow cost of public funds and privatization policies," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    10. Antonio Estache & Tomas Serebrisky & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2015. "Financing infrastructure in developing countries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 31(3-4), pages 279-304.
    11. Shi, Shasha & Tuo, Yuhui & Pan, Meixu & Yin, Yafeng & Chen, Yue & Zhou, Xiongwei & Chen, Ke, 2024. "Signaling contracts design for Build–Operate–Transfer roads under asymmetric traffic demand information," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    12. Michael Klien, 2014. "Corporatization and the Behavior of Public Firms: How Shifting Control Rights Affects Political Interference in Water Prices," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(4), pages 393-422, June.
    13. Heijdra, Ben J. & Ligthart, Jenny E., 2007. "Fiscal policy, monopolistic competition, and finite lives," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 325-359, January.
    14. Dementiev, Andrei & Han, Hyen Jin, 2020. "A theory of deregulation in public transport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    15. Li, Shuai & Cai, Jiannan & Feng, Zhuo & Xu, Yifang & Cai, Hubo, 2019. "Government contracting with monopoly in infrastructure provision: Regulation or deregulation?," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 506-523.
    16. Pierre M. Picard & Ridwan D. Rusli, 2012. "State Owned Firms: Private Debt, Cost Revelation and Welfare," DEM Discussion Paper Series 12-10, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    17. Qiu, Larry D. & Wang, Susheng, 2011. "BOT projects: Incentives and efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 127-138, January.
    18. Dementiev, Andrei, 2018. "Contracting out public transport services to vertical partnerships," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 126-134.
    19. Gilles Edouard Espinosa & Caroline Hillairet & Benjamin Jourdain & Monique Pontier, 2013. "Reducing the debt : is it optimal to outsource an investment?," Papers 1305.4879, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2015.
    20. Gilles Edouard Espinosa & Caroline Hillairet & Benjamin Jourdain & Monique Pontier, 2016. "Reducing the debt : is it optimal to outsource an investment?," Post-Print hal-00824390, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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