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Tariffs in an Economy with Incomplete Markets and Unemployment

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  • Raquel Fernandez

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal labor contract in a small open economy with incomplete markets under international price uncertainty. The effect on employment, wages, and profits of different realizations of the state of nature is studied and agents' preferences concerning the implementation of a tariff are determined. The implicit contract equilibrium is shown to be constrained Pareto optimal; unanticipated tariff policy cannot be Pareto improving over free trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Raquel Fernandez, 1988. "Tariffs in an Economy with Incomplete Markets and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 2705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2705
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-272, May.
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    6. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
    7. George A. Akerlof & Hajime Miyazaki, 1980. "The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(2), pages 321-338.
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    Cited by:

    1. Feestra, R.C. & Lewis, T.R. & Mcmillan, J., 1989. "Designing Policies To Open Trade," Papers 349, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    2. Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy Lewis & John McMillan, 1990. "Designing Policy To Open Trade," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 223-240, November.

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