Paid to Quit
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DOI: 10.1007/s10645-019-09347-9
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- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2015. "Paid to Quit," CESifo Working Paper Series 5648, CESifo.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2013. "Paid to Quit," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-174/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Dec 2015.
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More about this item
Keywords
Intrinsic motivation; Commitment; Self-selection; Wage compensation; Exit bonus; Transparency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices
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