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Fair pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability

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  • Jonathan P. Thomas

    (University of St Andrews)

Abstract

This paper considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favor of the new hires. Under an assumption on the information available to workers, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary. In an extension to the model, there may also be involuntary and excessive layoffs in some states of the world.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan P. Thomas, 2001. "Fair pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability," Labor and Demography 0012001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0012001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implicit contract theory; wage rigidity; involuntary unemployment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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