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Specific CApital, Long Term Implicit Contracts, and Temporary Layoffs

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  • John Haltiwanger

    (UCLA)

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  • John Haltiwanger, 1982. "Specific CApital, Long Term Implicit Contracts, and Temporary Layoffs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 245, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:245
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp245.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George A. Akerlof & Hajime Miyazaki, 1980. "The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(2), pages 321-338.
    2. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 9-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Solow, Robert M, 1980. "On Theories of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 1-11, March.
    5. Grossman, Herschel I, 1979. "Employment Fluctuations and the Mitigation of Risk," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 344-358, July.
    6. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1980. "Search, Layoffs, and Labor Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(4), pages 652-672, August.
    7. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1979. "Bonus Payments, on-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 1086-1104, October.
    8. Gordon, Donald F, 1974. "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(4), pages 431-459, December.
    9. Rothschild, Michael, 1973. "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1283-1308, Nov.-Dec..
    10. William Poole, 1976. "Rational Expectations in the Macro Model," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 7(2), pages 463-514.
    11. William Poole, 2001. "Expectations," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 83(Mar), pages 1-10.
    12. Ehrenberg, Ronald G., 1971. "Heterogeneous labor, the internal labor market, and the dynamics of the employment-hours decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 85-104, March.
    13. Bengt Holmstrom, 1980. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Discussion Papers 414R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    14. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
    15. Herschel I. Grossman, 1981. "Incomplete Information, Risk Shifting, and Employment Fluctuations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 189-197.
    16. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "On The Theory of Layoffs," Discussion Papers 322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
    18. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
    19. Oliver E. Williamson & Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, 1975. "Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 250-278, Spring.
    20. Salop, S. C., 1973. "Wage differentials in a dynamic theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 321-344, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Haltiwanger, 1982. "On the Relationship Between Risk Aversion and the Development of Long Term Worker-Firm Attachments," UCLA Economics Working Papers 274, UCLA Department of Economics.

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