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Teamwork, Leadership and Gender

Author

Listed:
  • De Paola, Maria

    (University of Calabria)

  • Gioia, Francesca

    (University of Milan)

  • Scoppa, Vincenzo

    (University of Calabria)

Abstract

We ran a field experiment to investigate whether individual performance in teams depends on the gender of the leader. About 430 students from an Italian University took an intermediate exam that was partly evaluated on the basis of teamwork. Students were randomly matched in teams of three and in each team we randomly chose a leader with the task of coordinating the work of the team. We find a positive and significant effect of female leadership on team performance. This effect is driven by the higher performance of team members in female led teams rather than due to an improvement in the leader's performance. We also find that, in spite of the higher performance of female led teams, male members tend to evaluate female leaders as less effective, whereas female members are more sympathetic towards them.

Suggested Citation

  • De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "Teamwork, Leadership and Gender," IZA Discussion Papers 11861, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11861
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timko, Krisztina, 2017. "Gender, Communication Styles, and Leader Effectiveness," MPRA Paper 77021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September.
    3. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
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    6. Martin Dufwenberg & Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Gender & Coordination," Springer Books, in: Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport (ed.), Experimental Business Research, chapter 0, pages 253-262, Springer.
    7. Grossman, Philip J. & Eckel, Catherine & Komai, Mana & Zhan, Wei, 2019. "It pays to be a man: Rewards for leaders in a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 197-215.
    8. Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
    9. Ernesto Reuben & Krisztina Timko, 2018. "On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 123-135, December.
    10. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2007. "It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager–Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(6), pages 1223-1268, December.
    11. Selhan Garip Sahin & Catherine Eckel & Mana Komai, 2015. "An experimental study of leadership institutions in collective action games," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 100-113, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elizabeth J. Casabianca & Alessia Lo Turco & Claudia Pigini, 2020. "Equal Pay for Equal Task: Assessing Heterogeneous Returns to Tasks across Genders," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 197-239, April.
    2. Florian Englmaier & Stefan Grimm & Dominik Grothe & David Schindler & Simeon Schudy, 2021. "The Value of Leadership: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9273, CESifo.
    3. Ulf Rinne & Hendrik Sonnabend, 2022. "Female workers, male managers: Gender, leadership, and risk‐taking," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(3), pages 906-930, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    stereotypes; gender; leadership; team; randomized experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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