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Leadership By Example In The Weak-Link Game

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  • EDWARD CARTWRIGHT
  • JORIS GILLET
  • MARK VAN VUGT

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  • Edward Cartwright & Joris Gillet & Mark Van Vugt, 2013. "Leadership By Example In The Weak-Link Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2028-2043, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:4:p:2028-2043
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    22. Jordi Brandts & David Cooper, 2006. "Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(4), pages 407-423, December.
    23. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006. "A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 669-693, June.
    24. Marc Knez & Colin Camerer, 1994. "Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in ‘Weakest‐Link’ Games," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(S1), pages 101-119, December.
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    26. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
    27. Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Yuval Rottenstreich & Marc Knez, 2001. "The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(5), pages 582-598, October.
    28. Erling Moxnes & Eline van der Heijden, 2003. "The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(6), pages 773-795, December.
    29. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Roberto A. Weber, 2015. "Legitimacy, Communication, and Leadership in the Turnaround Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(11), pages 2627-2645, November.
    2. Gregor, Martin, 2015. "Task divisions in teams with complementary tasks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 102-120.
    3. Christian Zehnder & Holger Herz & Jean-Philippe Bonardi, 2016. "A Productive Clash of Cultures: Injecting Economics into Leadership Research," CESifo Working Paper Series 6175, CESifo.
    4. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2020. "Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination," Working Papers 1211, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Jing Yu & Martin G. Kocher, 2023. "Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 685-712, October.
    6. Gürerk, Özgür & Lauer, Thomas & Scheuermann, Martin, 2018. "Leadership with individual rewards and punishments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 57-69.
    7. Florian Englmaier & Stefan Grimm & Dominik Grothe & David Schindler & Simeon Schudy, 2021. "The Value of Leadership: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9273, CESifo.
    8. Sonia Bhalotra & Irma Clots-Figueras & Lakshmi Iyer & Joseph Vecci, 2023. "Leader Identity and Coordination," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 175-189, January.
    9. Lu Dong & Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov, 2018. "Communication, leadership and coordination failure," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 557-584, June.
    10. Edward J. Cartwright & Denise Lovett, 2014. "Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-23, November.
    11. Caria, A. Stefano & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2019. "Expectations, network centrality, and public good contributions: Experimental evidence from India," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 391-408.
    12. Baethge, Caroline & Fiedler, Marina, 2016. "Aligning mission preferences: Does self-selection foster performance in working groups?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe B-18-16, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    13. Malte Müller & Jens Rommel & Christian Kimmich, 2018. "Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 19(2), pages 119-139, May.
    14. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Neset Joslin, Knut-Eric, 2018. "Should I Stay or should I Go? Bandwagons in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 86-97.
    15. José Gabriel Castillo & Zhicheng Phil Xu & Ping Zhang & Xianchen Zhu, 2021. "The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 385-419, February.
    16. Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2016. "Disentangling Social Capital: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination, Networks, and Cooperation," Artefactual Field Experiments 00565, The Field Experiments Website.
    17. Edward Cartwright, 2018. "The Optimal Strategy in the Minimum Effort Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-11, June.
    18. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2022. "Why don’t we talk about it? Communication and coordination in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 257-278.

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