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Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Alain de Janvry

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Guojun He

    (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

  • Elisabeth Sadoulet

    (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Shaoda Wang

    (University of Chicago)

  • Qiong Zhang

    (Renmin University of China)

Abstract

Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to local senior leadership could induce influence activities: agents might devote much effort to pleasing their supervisors, rather than focusing on productive tasks that benefit their organizations. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese local government employees and provide the first rigorous empirical evidence on the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that employees do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, and that this process can be partly observed by their co-workers. However, introducing uncertainty in the identity of the evaluator discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and significantly improves the work performance of local government employees.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain de Janvry & Guojun He & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Shaoda Wang & Qiong Zhang, 2020. "Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202003, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:hke:wpaper:wp2020-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    subjective evaluation; influence activities; civil servants; work performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • F63 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Economic Development

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