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The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation

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  • Fleurbaey, Marc
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
  • 鈴村, 興太郎
  • Tadenuma, Koichi
  • 蓼沼, 宏一

Abstract

The theory of fair allocation is often favourably contrasted with the social choice theory in the search for escape routes from Arrow's impossibility theorem. Its success is commonly attributed to the fact that it is modest in its goal vis-a-vis social choice theory, since it does not aspire for a full-fledged ordering of options, and settles with a subset of "fair" options. We show that its success may rather be attributable to a broadened informational basis thereof. To substantiate this claim, we compare the informational basis of the theory of fair allocation with the informational requirements of social choice theory.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2002. "The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation," Discussion Papers 2002-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2002-11
    Note: This version: November 2002 (First version: July 2001), This paper is derived from an earlier draft of our paper entitled "Informational requirements for social choice in economic environments".
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/17006/070econDP02-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    2. Michel Breton, 1997. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," International Economic Association Series, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura (ed.), Social Choice Re-examined, chapter 4, pages 72-96, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being," IDEP Working Papers 0312, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
    2. Marc Fleurbaey & Koichi Tadenuma, 2007. "Do Irrelevant Commodities Matter?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1143-1174, July.
    3. Sakai, Toyotaka, 2009. "Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 16-22, January.
    4. Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate," IDEP Working Papers 0405, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
    5. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.
    6. Dan Qin, 2015. "On $$\mathcal {S}$$ S -independence and Hansson’s external independence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 359-371, September.
    7. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 511-527, April.
    8. Dan Qin, 2014. "Refining the Information Function Method: Instrument and Application," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 84-101, October.
    9. Nikolai Hoberg & Stefan Baumgärtner, 2014. "Value pluralism, trade-offs and efficiencies," Working Paper Series in Economics 311, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    10. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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