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Single-Peaked Choice

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  • BOSSERT, Walter
  • PETERS, Hans

Abstract

Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective. We show that the well-known axiom independence of irrelevant alternatives (a form of contraction consistency) and a weak continuity requirement characterize a class of single-peaked choice functions. Moreover, we examine the rationalizability and the rationalizability-representability of these choice functions.

Suggested Citation

  • BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans, 2006. "Single-Peaked Choice," Cahiers de recherche 2006-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-14
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2151
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2009. "Single-peaked choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 213-230, November.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    5. Bossert, Walter, 1994. "Rational choice and two-person bargaining solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 549-563, November.
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    7. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
    8. Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche 2002-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    10. Peters Hans & Wakker Peter, 1994. "WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 152-160, February.
    11. Debreu, Gerard, 1972. "Smooth Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 603-615, July.
    12. Miguel Ángel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2006. "A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences," Working Papers 273, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Jaffray, Jean-Yves, 1975. "Semicontinuous extension of a partial order," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 395-406, December.
    14. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Single-basined choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 162-168.
    2. Hans Peters & Panos Protopapas, 2021. "Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 11-29, February.
    3. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2013. "Single-plateaued choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 134-139.
    4. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2019. "Choice on the simplex domain," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 63-72.
    5. Özgür Kıbrıs, 2012. "A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 509-523, April.
    6. Miguel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2011. "A characterization of the single-peaked domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 305-322, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single-akedness; choice functions; rationalizability; reesentability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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