IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/pal/intecp/978-1-349-25849-9_7.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains

In: Social Choice Re-examined

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Breton

    (Universite D’aix-Marseille)

Abstract

Since the pioneering work of Arrow (1951, 1963), social choice theory has developed a long tradition of research on the principles that should guide decision-makers when they have to solve conflicts of interests or judgements among the individuals in a group. In the ordinal non-comparability framework considered by Arrow a social choice issue is described by a profile of preferences and a feasible set. A Social Choice Correspondence selects for each social choice issue a subset of outcomes from the feasible set. Arrow focused on three principles. The first one (weak Pareto) puts some constraints on the set of choices for a given preference profile and a given feasible set. The second one (Arrow’s Choice Axiom) demands invariance of the set of choices when the feasible set shrinks in a specific way but the preference profile is fixed. The third one (Independence of Infeasible Alternatives) demands invariance of the set of choices when the preference profile changes in a specific way but the feasible set is fixed. The domain of the social choice correspondence consists of all the pairs of preference profiles and feasible sets that may arise as possible social choice issues. Arrow proved that if the domain contains all possible preference profiles (Unrestricted Preference Domain) and all finite subsets (Unrestricted Feasible Set Domain) then only the dictatorial social choice correspondences meet the three principles. Hereafter the last part of the statement will be referred to as the Arrow inconsistency.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Breton, 1997. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," International Economic Association Series, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura (ed.), Social Choice Re-examined, chapter 4, pages 72-96, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25849-9_7
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(2), pages 311-341, April.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
    3. Christopher Chambers & Takashi Hayashi, 2012. "Money-metric utilitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 809-831, October.
    4. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Social choice with analytic preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 637-657.
    5. Marc Fleurbaey & Koichi Tadenuma, 2007. "Do Irrelevant Commodities Matter?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1143-1174, July.
    6. Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & Tadenuma, Koichi & 蓼沼, 宏一, 2000. "Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments," Discussion Papers 2000-07, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate," IDEP Working Papers 0405, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25849-9_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.