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Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

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  • Maniquet, François

Abstract

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.

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  • Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:199-215
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    3. Medernach, Emmanuel & Sanlaville, Eric, 2012. "Fair resource allocation for different scenarios of demands," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 218(2), pages 339-350.
    4. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indivisible good Social ordering function Leximin;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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