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Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state

Author

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  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Economists have adopted two broad perspectives on the state: contractual (i.e., provider of public goods and services) and predatory (coercive and extractive). By a predatory state, we mean a state that promotes the private interests of dominant groups within the state (such as politicians, the army and bureaucrats) or influential private groups with strong lobbying powers. Neo-institutional economists support an extended version of the contractual perspective in which the state is not simply a ‘benevolent dictator’ but may itself be composed of predators. However, it considers predation as only a means to promote protection. By contrast, a predatory vision of the state argues that while protection and predation are two faces of the same coin, a predatory state protects only to promote its predation on the private sector. This symposium explores how a predatory approach to the state can shed light on all types of state, from liberal democratic to authoritarian and failed ones, both in the past and present.
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Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state," Post-Print hal-02288776, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02288776
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00715-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

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