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State: Predatory nature vs. civil society

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  • Zaostrovtsev, A.

    (HSE University; ICSER "Leontiev Center", Saint Petersburg, Russia)

Abstract

The article presents the predatory nature of the state as its universal property. It opposes both markets and civil society. However, if markets and civil society are included in the definition of the state, this will be an ideological justifi cation for their absorption by the state. The government is viewed as striving for constant expansion by reducing civil institutions and ultimately turning the latter into state institution. The surveys of russian experts on political participation, civil rights etc. are briefly analyzed. It is concluded that one can assert that the Russian state is in an intermediate position, located between neopatrimonialism and neosultanism. The revival of civil society through the development of social networks is not seen as a real prospect due to the advantages of state as central actor in the digital world and the bearer of right to legitimate violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Zaostrovtsev, A., 2024. "State: Predatory nature vs. civil society," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 237-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2024:i:65:p:237-244
    DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2024_4_237-244
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    predatory state; civil society; power-ownership society; neo-patrimonial state; neosultanistic state; social networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • C43 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Index Numbers and Aggregation

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