Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power
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More about this item
Keywords
economic elites; power-sharing institutions; institutional design; political economy; elite competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
- P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2021-09-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GRO-2021-09-13 (Economic Growth)
- NEP-ISF-2021-09-13 (Islamic Finance)
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