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Regulating quack medicine

Author

Listed:
  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University)

  • M. Scott King

    (George Mason University)

  • Tate J. Fegley

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

Quack medicines were prepackaged, commercially marketed medicinal concoctions brewed from “secret recipes” that often contained powerful drugs. Governmental regulation of them in late nineteenth-century England is heralded as a landmark of public health policy. We argue that it’s instead a landmark of medicinal rent-seeking. We develop a theory of quack medicine regulation in Victorian England according to which health professionals faced growing competition from close substitutes: quack medicine vendors. To protect their rents, health professionals organized, lobbied, and won laws granting them a monopoly over the sale of “poisonous” medicaments, most notably, quack medicines.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson & M. Scott King & Tate J. Fegley, 2020. "Regulating quack medicine," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 273-286, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00656-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00656-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2020. "Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 233-242, March.
    2. Samira Guennif, 2022. "Capture and passive predation in times of COVID-19 pandemic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 163-186, December.
    3. Vincent Geloso & Raymond J. March, 2021. "Rent seeking for madness: the political economy of mental asylums in the United States, 1870 to 1910," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 375-404, December.
    4. Bálint Madlovics & Bálint Magyar, 2021. "Post-communist predation: modeling reiderstvo practices in contemporary predatory states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 247-273, June.
    5. Leeson, Peter T., 2022. "A normal market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    6. Candela, Rosolino A. & Piano, Ennio E., 2020. "The Art and Science of Economic Explanation: Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Yoram Barzel," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 119-126, April.
    7. Peter T. Leeson & Henry A. Thompson, 2023. "Public choice and public health," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 5-41, April.
    8. Brandon N. Cline & Claudia R. Williamson & Haoyang Xiong, 2022. "Trust, regulation, and market efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 427-456, March.
    9. Glenn L. Furton, 2023. "The pox of politics: Troesken’s tradeoff reexamined," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 169-191, April.
    10. Daniel J. Smith & Macy Scheck, 2023. "Examining the public interest rationale for regulating whiskey with the pure food and drugs act," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 85-122, July.
    11. March, Raymond J. & Geloso, Vincent, 2020. "Gordon Tullock meets Phineas Gage: The political economy of lobotomies in the United States," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(1).

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