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Capitalist transformation without political participation: German capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth century

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  • Gerhard Wegner

Abstract

The paper analyzes the political economy of capitalist transformation in nineteenth century Germany. The emergence of capitalism after 1806 gives an example that economic freedom can precede political freedom, leaving the political power of the “dominant coalition” intact. The paper argues that the German capitalist transformation was instigated by competition among the European states. Primarily it was conducive to the monopolization of the coercive power of the state. As a result competition among the states drove a wedge between the interests of the monarch and his supporting dominant coalition (landed gentry). The increasingly independent public administration in Prussia which was influenced by Adam Smith’s liberal ideas organized a political bargain which established economic freedom in various sectors but took the economic interests of the landed gentry into account. In various aspects the sweeping institutional change was Pareto-superior for groups, which made capitalism also acceptable for the elite group. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

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  • Gerhard Wegner, 2015. "Capitalist transformation without political participation: German capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth century," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 61-86, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:26:y:2015:i:1:p:61-86
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9171-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Uebele, Martin & Pfister, Ulrich & Riedel, Jana, 2012. "Real wages and the origins of modern economic growth in Germany, 16th to 19th centuries," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62076, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Wegner, Gerhard, 2012. "Ökonomischer Liberalismus als politische Theorie," Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 62, number urn:isbn:9783161518744.
    3. Joachim Zweynert, 2011. "Shock therapy and the transfer of institutions: the new debate and some lessons from the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in southwestern Germany," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 122-140, June.
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    5. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, September.
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    8. Wegner, Gerhard, 2012. "Ökonomischer Liberalismus als politische Theorie," Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 62, number urn:isbn:9783161510342.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Stefano Spalletti, 2017. "Elementi di pensiero economico nello Stato commerciale chiuso di J. G. Fichte," Working Papers 49-2017, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Jun 2017.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Industrialization; Capitalist institutions; Economic freedom; Political order; N4; O14; P1;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • O14 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
    • P1 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies

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