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Capture and passive predation in times of COVID-19 pandemic

Author

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  • Samira Guennif

    (Université Sorbonne Paris Nord)

Abstract

In the midst of a health crisis, a drug in development and candidate for COVID-19 contagious disease was granted orphan-drug designation (ODD). This decision by the US Food and Drug Administration was immediately denounced as an abuse of the Orphan Drug Act (ODA). This paper outlines how this decision may be considered as the result of a complex case of capture along the regulatory process. Therefore, a case study of the remdesivir episode is conducted, combining the definition of a framework for the analysis of capture and the identification of stylized facts marking the trajectory of a repositioned drug and candidate for COVID-19. In doing so, arguments are put forward to show to what extent this granting of ODD can be described as the result of a series of captures, a case of weak capture however that calls for an amendment of the ODA to preclude drugs for contagious and communicable epidemic diseases from obtaining orphan status in the first place.

Suggested Citation

  • Samira Guennif, 2022. "Capture and passive predation in times of COVID-19 pandemic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 163-186, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:193:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-022-01005-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01005-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Predation; Capture; Regulation; Rent-seeking; Orphan drug; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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