Le changement institutionnel peut-il être analysé comme évolutionnaire ? quelques limites de l'approche économique standard et quelques voies ouvertes à l'approche évolutionnaire

The interrogation of the paper is a simple one : the process of regulation change has mainly been analyzed by theoreticians of law not by pure economists. Nevertheless, some american economists have proposed economic analysis of law : in this case, the analysis appeared to be too complex to be modelized. Here, we draw up an inventory of the contributions of those different schools in economics : the public-interest approach in public economics, the politico-economical approach of group of interest and the capture of the regulator (Chicago's school) ; a generalization of the later approach wellknown as the « rent-seeking » approach. Questions are : what about the potentalities of these economic approaches? And is there still some place for a specific institutionnalist approach? Could we find an interest in a more evolutionnist economic approach of regulation change, as specialists of genesis of laws do?