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Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective

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  • P. Hägg

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  • P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:4:y:1997:i:4:p:337-370
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008632529703
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