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Voting, Regulation, and the Railroad Industry: An Analysis of Private and Public Interest Voting Patterns

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  • Kevin Henrickson
  • Wesley Wilson

Abstract

We examine the role of public and private interests in the passage of major legislative bills that have governed the rail industry since 1887. Our model of voting patterns in the House and Senate introduces novel measures of industry concentration, competition, and network characteristics. We find that both the level and concentration of rail infrastructure in a state, the presence of water competition, and the level of agricultural production each have a major influence over voting patterns not only for the inception of regulation but also in the major bills that deregulated the industry in the 1970s and in 1980. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Henrickson & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Voting, Regulation, and the Railroad Industry: An Analysis of Private and Public Interest Voting Patterns," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(1), pages 21-39, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:43:y:2013:i:1:p:21-39
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-013-9402-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard L. Schmalensee & Wesley W. Wilson, 2016. "Modernizing U.S. Freight Rail Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 133-159, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Railroads; Public and private interest ; Voting patterns; K2; L9;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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