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Privatization: A Market Prospect Perspective

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  • Kamath Shyam J.

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  • Kamath Shyam J., 1994. "Privatization: A Market Prospect Perspective," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 53-104, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:52:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-1994-0103
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