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Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions

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  • William C. Mitchell

Abstract

This paper affords an informal introduction to the work of economists on interest groups and their role in the political process. Among the major analysts considered are Olson, Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, Becker and the Virginia economists, notably Tullock and Tollison. Political scientists are encouraged to become familiar with this body of work because the study of `rent-seeking' is now a major enterprise within public choice.

Suggested Citation

  • William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:85-108
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692890002001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. repec:bla:kyklos:v:27:y:1974:i:2:p:378-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
    4. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    6. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    7. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    8. Gordon Tullock, 1974. "More On The Welfare Costs Of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 378-381, January.
    9. repec:bla:kyklos:v:24:y:1971:i:4:p:629-43 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    11. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The Cost Of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 629-643, November.
    12. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard T. Cupitt & Euel Elliott, 1994. "Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting On The Smoot‐Hawley Tariff Act Of 1930," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 187-199, November.
    2. Schmid, A. Allan & Soroko, David, 1997. "Interest groups, selective incentives, cleverness, history and emotion: The case of the American Soybean Association," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-285, February.
    3. Lynch, Sarah, 1994. "Designing Green Support Programs," Policy Studies Program Reports, Henry A. Wallace Institute for Alternative Agriculture, number 134111, January.
    4. G. P. Manish & Colin O’Reilly, 2019. "Banking regulation, regulatory capture and inequality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 145-164, July.

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