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Incitation à la qualité dans la relation vignoble-négoce

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  • Séverine Gaucher
  • Louis-Georges Soler
  • Hervé Tanguy

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  • Séverine Gaucher & Louis-Georges Soler & Hervé Tanguy, 2002. "Incitation à la qualité dans la relation vignoble-négoce," Post-Print hal-01200937, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01200937
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01200937
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 633-653, Winter.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-282, March.
    4. Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, 1996. "Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1248-1253.
    5. Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1995. "Option contracts and renegotiation," Munich Reprints in Economics 19329, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. David A. Hennessy, 1996. "Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 1034-1043.
    7. Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer.
    8. Hennessy, David A., 1996. "Information Asymmetry As a Reason for Vertical Integration," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10422, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Soler, Louis-Georges & Tanguy, Herve, 1999. "Avoiding Double Marginalisation in Agro-Food Chains," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 26(2), pages 179-198, June.
    10. De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 22-39, January.
    11. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    12. Sylvette Monier-Dilhan & Hervé Ossard, 1999. "Pleasures of Cockaigne: Quality Gaps, Market Structure, and the Amount of Grading," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(3), pages 501-511.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hervé Lanotte & Aurélie Ringeval-Deluze & Erick Pruchnicki, 2022. "The stabilising effects on GVCs of multi-annual supply contracts between leading and subordinate firms: The example of champagne [Les effets stabilisateurs sur la CGV des contrats pluriannuels d’ap," Post-Print hal-04021392, HAL.

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