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Information Exchange among Firms: The Coherence of Justice Brandeis' Regulated Competition Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Patrice Bougette

    (Université Côte d'Azur
    GREDEG CNRS)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS
    OFCE, Sciences Po., Paris
    CIRANO, Montréal)

Abstract

During the 1920s, two different proposals of a regulated competition competed in the US. The first, inspired by trade associations, was advocated by Herbert Hoover. This approach echoes a managerialist view of a coordinated competition under state support. The second – promoted by Louis Brandeis – provides an alternative view of what a regulated competition should be: avoiding a ruinous competition through information exchange among small firms. From his involvement in the Wilson's campaign team in 1912, to his dissent in the American Colum ruling of the US Supreme Court in 1923 and his position against the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Poultry in 1935, we argue that Louis Brandeis was constant in his opposition to such a convergence between Big Business and Big Government. His intemporal coherence relies in his Jeffersonian approach advocating for a dispersion of economic powers for both efficiency and political purposes. At the opposite, both the trade associations' movement and the NIRA experience pertain to an Alexander Hamilton's perspective that is based on an equilibrium between the economic gains resulting from concentration or coordination and a strong political control.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty, 2020. "Information Exchange among Firms: The Coherence of Justice Brandeis' Regulated Competition Approach," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-56, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Feb 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-56
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bougette, Patrice & Deschamps, Marc & Marty, Frédéric, 2015. "When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law," Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 313-353, June.
    2. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal," CIRANO Working Papers 2019s-12, CIRANO.
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    4. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    5. Wells, Wyatt, 2004. "Counterpoint to Reform: Gilbert H. Montague and the Business of Regulation," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 423-450, October.
    6. Patrice Bougette & Marc Deschamps & Frédéric Marty, 2015. "When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law," Post-Print halshs-01090048, HAL.
    7. Frédéric Marty & Thierry Kirat, 2018. "Les mutations du néolibéralisme américain quant à l’articulation des libertés économiques et de la démocratie," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 471-498.
    8. Robert Van Horn & Ross B. Emmett, 2015. "Two trajectories of democratic capitalism in the post-war Chicago school: Frank Knight versus Aaron Director," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 39(5), pages 1443-1455.
    9. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2020. "From the First World War to the National Recovery Administration (1917-1935) - The Case for Regulated Competition in the United States during the Interwar Period," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-66, CIRANO.
    10. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T., 1992. "The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's court-packing plan," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 45-67, March.
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    12. Alison J. Kirby, 1988. "Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 138-146, Spring.
    13. Carrott, M. Browning, 1970. "The Supreme Court and American Trade Associations, 1921–1925," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 320-338, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Marty, 2021. "Competition and Regulatory Challenges in Digital Markets: How to Tackle the Issue of Self-Preferencing?," Working Papers halshs-03227392, HAL.
    2. Frédéric Marty & Thierry Warin, 2020. "Digital Platforms' Information Concentration: From Keystone Players to Gatekeepers," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-70, CIRANO.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Louis Brandeis; antitrust; information exchange; Federal Trade Commission (FTC); New Deal; National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA);
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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